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ABSTRACT 
One area of particular concern for computer forensics examiners involves 
situations in which someone utilized software applications to destroy evidence. 
There are products available in the marketplace that are relatively inexpensive and 
advertised as being able to destroy targeted portions of data stored within a 
computer system. This study was undertaken to analyze a subset of these tools in 
order to identify trace evidence, if any, left behind on disk media after executing 
these applications. We evaluated five Windows 7 compatible software products 
whose advertised features include the ability for users to wipe targeted files, 
folders, or evidence of selected activities. We conducted a series of experiments 
that involved executing each application on systems with identical data, and we 
then analyzed the results and compared the before and after images for each 
application. We identified information for each application that is beneficial to 
forensics examiners when faced with similar situations. This paper describes our 
application selection process, our application evaluation methodology, and our 
findings, including the variability of the effects of these tools. Following this, we 
describe limitations of this study and suggest areas of additional research that will 
benefit the study of digital forensics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Arguably, one of the most difficult challenges facing computer forensics 
examiners concerns identifying evidence from digital data in situations where 
someone has deliberately attempted to destroy information. This challenge is 
compounded by conflicting perspectives, as individuals that hire computer 
forensics examiners seem to anticipate that professionals within this field are able 
to retrieve all relevant evidence, individuals that wipe data do so with the intent 
that their techniques are sufficiently elaborate enough to prevent information from 
being recovered, and forensic examiners may be driven by professional pride and 
the satisfaction of performing their craft well in order to uncover evidence wiped 
by sophisticated methods. These conflicting goals between those that attempt to 
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hide evidence and those that seek to submit recovered evidence within the legal 
system increase the levels of risk and uncertainty facing computer forensics 
examiners in situations where attempts to destroy data have occurred. 
One area of particular concern for computer forensics examiners involves 
situations in which someone utilized software utilities or applications designed 
specifically to destroy evidence (R-Tools Technology, 2011). There are a number 
of products available in the marketplace that are easily available, relatively 
inexpensive, and advertised as being tools to destroy targeted portions of data 
stored within a computer system (Hughes, Coughlin, & Commins, 2009). This 
study was undertaken to identify these tools and analyze them. Our analysis goals 
focus on identifying trace evidence, if any, left behind on suspect disk media after 
executing these applications (O & O Software, GmbH, 2011). We found two 
examples of prior literature that addressed this topic; however, both of them are 
based on older versions of Windows operating systems. The earlier work 
evaluated “disk cleaners” on Windows 98 and Windows 2000 based systems 
(Jones & Meyler, 2004). More recently, a paper discussed “disk scrubbers” on 
Windows XP based systems, and Jones and Meyler (Geiger, 2006). 
We evaluated five Windows 7 compatible software application products whose 
advertised features include the ability for users to wipe targeted files, folders, or 
evidence of selected activities (i.e., Internet history, registry keys, etc.) 
(KremlinEncrypt.com, 2008). Rather than select tools that simply wipe entire 
storage devices, we chose to evaluate tools that target portions of storage media, 
as the potential exists to recover data from partially wiped media, especially if the 
wiping application performed poorly or left trace evidence (Paragon Technologies 
GmbH, 2011). 
After selecting five file wiping applications, we conducted a series of experiments 
that involved executing each application on systems with identical data. We then 
analyzed the results and compared the before and after images for each 
application. While the extent of wiping data differs among the applications, we 
identified information concerning each application that is beneficial to forensics 
examiners when faced with obtaining evidence from systems subjected to similar 
situations. 
The following sections describe our application selection process, our application 
evaluation methodology, and our findings. Following this, we describe limitations 
of this study and suggest areas of additional research that will benefit the study of 
digital forensics. 
2. APPLICATION SELECTION 
The data wiping software products on the market can be divided into two broad 
categories: those that simply wipe an entire volume or device and those that allow 
users to target selected files, folders, or data related to certain activities (e.g., 
Internet history or server log files). The software utilities or applications we chose 
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to evaluate are those that allow users to wipe targeted files or folders within a 
specified volume or device, as this set of products provide the potential for 
suspects to intentionally attempt to conceal their activities while maintaining a 
useable system. Our objective was to identify trace evidence available on known 
systems in which the selected applications have been utilized.  
In addition to the ability to select specific files or folders within a volume, we 
chose to focus on the Windows 7 operating system. Our justification for this is 
that Windows is the most widely used family of operating systems and, at the 
time of this study, Windows 7 is the most recent version available. Although large 
numbers of Windows XP and Windows Vista installations are currently in use, 
Windows 7 is likely to be more widely used as time moves forward. 
Table 1 - Initial data wiping applications 
Product File/Folder Target 
Wiping 
Windows 7  
Compatible 
Acronis Drive Cleanser No No 
Active@KillDisk Yes Yes 
Bodrag Wipe Expert 2 Yes No 
Darik’s Boot and Nuke No No 
Data Wiper Tool Yes No 
Heidi Eraser Yes Yes 
Evidence Eliminator Yes Yes 
Evidence Smart Yes Yes 
HDDerase No No 
Iolo DriveScrubber Yes Yes 
Jetico BCWipe Yes Yes 
Kremlin Wipe No No 
O&O Safe Erase Yes Yes 
Paragon Disk Wiper 
Personal 
No Yes 
R-Wipe & Clean Yes Yes 
UltraSentry Yes Yes 
Webroot Window Washer Yes Yes 
Active@Eraser Yes Yes 
 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2) 
116 
Our selection process began in March, 2011, by selecting a team of senior, 
undergraduate Computer Information Systems students at California State 
Polytechnic University (Cal Poly Pomona) that had successfully completed 
coursework in Computer Forensics. After describing our objectives to the team of 
students, we asked them to perform research to identify the data wiping 
applications that met our criteria. The student team was instructed to use the 
Internet as a research tool to approximate the procedures we believed typical 
suspects were likely to follow to learn of these tools. As a result, the student team 
identified a set of eighteen applications, as listed in Table 1 (EvidenceSmart.com, 
2011) (GEEP EDS LLC., 2011) . 
We reviewed each of the products identified in Table 1 - Initial data wiping 
applications using criteria including purchase price, the availability of a fully-
functional trial version, customizability, reporting capability, security standards, 
targeted file/folder wiping, registry wiping, device wiping, partition or volume 
wiping, graphical user interface (GUI), and logging capability(Acronis Inc, 2011) 
(Bodrag S.R.L., 2011).  We then selected five products for comprehensive 
analysis from the list, with each of the products meeting our minimum 
requirements and collectively providing an extensive range of features. 
Additionally, the five selected data wiping tools ranged in purchase price from 
free to the most expensive product identified. The products selected for analysis 
are listed in Table 2 - Selected data wiping applications. 
Table 2 - Selected data wiping applications 
Product Version Purchase 
Price 
File/Folder 
Wiping 
GUI 
Heidi Eraser 6.0.8 Free Yes Yes 
Evidence 
Eliminator 
6.0.3 $149.95 Yes Yes 
Jetico BCWipe 5.01.2 $39.95 Yes Yes 
Active@Eraser 4.1.0.5 $29.95 Yes Yes 
Webroot Window 
Washer 
6.6.1.18 $29.95 Yes Yes 
 
We limited our evaluation to five applications, as we had determined that this was 
the maximum number of applications we could feasibly test extensively given our 
limited resources and time constraints. We also felt that this was an adequate 
number of applications to test, as this was intended as a demonstration of 
capability rather than an exhaustive study. Each of the selected applications 
utilized a GUI, as we reasoned that non-technical individuals were more likely to 
use them instead of command-line products. Finally, all selected applications 
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allowed targeted file and folder wiping, and they operated on the Windows 7 
operating system. A summary of the features of each of these applications is 
described below: 
2.1 Heidi Eraser 
Eraser, distributed by Heidi Computers, Ltd., is a freely available data wiping 
application that is released under the GNU General Public License, including its 
source code (Heidi Computers, Ltd., 2010). This tool’s features include the ability 
to remove selected files and folders, support for all Windows compatible drives, 
and use of a customized scheduler (Low, 2010). Additionally, the version of 
Eraser used in this study (v6.0.8) operates on Windows XP and all existing, 
subsequent versions of the Windows operating system.  
2.2 Evidence Eliminator 
Evidence Eliminator is a data wiping application that can, ostensibly, target a 
large array of files that can be wiped and hidden from forensics analysis. Among 
the specific items that can targeted for elimination in the test version are swap 
files, application logs, temporary files, the Recycle Bin, registry backups, Internet 
Explorer (IE) temporary typed Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), cache and 
history files, AutoComplete forms and passwords, cookies, and slack space 
(Robin Hood Software Ltd., 2011). 
2.3 Jetico BCWipe 
Jetico Inc’s BCWipe, like the products above, can target user-specified files and 
directories, or classes of files such as Internet history, swap file, file slack space, 
Master File Table (MFT) records and directory entries (Jetco Inc., 2011). In 
addition, BCWipe can be installed as part of the Windows Explorer content-
sensitive menus. 
2.4 Active@ ERASER 
Active Data Security Solutions' Active@ ERASER has similar features to the 
other test software, including the ability to reside within the Windows Explorer's 
menus. Active@ Eraser’s features also include the ability to remove specified 
files and folders, as well as Internet and local activity history files created by 
several browsers (Active Data Security Solutions, 2011). 
2.5 Webroot Window Washer 
Webroot Software, Inc.'s Window Washer is a broad-featured application that 
claims to "wash" many types of files in order to enhance a user's privacy 
protection. In addition to erasing Internet activity (supporting a number of 
browsers), wiping files and free space, and "shredding" files and directories, 
Window Washer can also clean up files associated with a variety of applications, 
such as Microsoft Office, iTunes, Adobe Flash Player, and Adobe Acrobat 
(Webroot Software, Inc., 2011). 
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3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
After selecting the five wiping applications described in Section 2, we proceeded 
to design and conduct a series of experiments using each application. This section 
describes the methodology we used to prepare test data and conduct our 
experiments. 
Our primary research objectives was to provide information useful for digital 
forensics examiners in identifying trace evidence left on suspect media after the 
execution of data wiping application software targeting selected data. To that end, 
we constructed a pre-experiment, personal computer system that would represent 
a consistent starting point prior to conducting our experiments. Using the pre-
experiment data image as a starting point, we then performed a set of tasks for 
each selected data wiping software product. After performing the tasks, we 
compared the post-experiment data images to the pre-experiment data image. In 
the following sections, we describe our preparation of evaluation data, the 
experiments we conducted, and our analysis of the data after conducting the 
experiments. 
Our secondary objective was to create a framework by which additional wiping 
applications could be tested and compared. Because new products are being 
introduced into this application space and the versions of existing products change 
frequently, we wanted to have a methodology that could be expanded to other, 
similar applications. 
3.1 Preparation of evaluation data 
Prior to conducting the experiments, we established an initial disk drive with 
which we could measure the changes caused by running each application. Our 
initial configuration consisted of a personal computer workstation in which we 
had installed a known set of data files. We installed each data wiping application 
onto a separate instance of the known initial configuration. 
The workstation used for this study had a single Seagate Barracuda 7200 160 GB 
internal hard disk drive as the only storage medium. To ensure that no data 
contamination existed on the physical disk drive, we used EnCase Law 
Enforcement (v6.11.2.2) to wipe the drive prior to using it. We selected null 
characters (i.e., 0x00) to be written to every byte of the physical disk using the 
EnCase disk wiping procedure. We verified that the wiping procedure completed 
successfully in two ways. First, EnCase provided a dialog box that indicated that 
the wiping process completed successfully. Second, we performed a global 
regular expression (grep) search for any non-null character on the physical disk 
using EnCase, and found none. Subsequently, we created a single 25 GB NTFS 
bootable partition on the hard disk drive and installed the Windows 7 operating 
system.  
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After installing the operating system, we placed sample data onto the disk drive to 
provide a basis from which we could evaluate the thoroughness of the selected 
wiping tools. Our sample data consisted of 57 data files organized within nine 
folders, as listed in Table 3 - Evidence data files. Most of the data files were 
downloaded directly from the Internet, including all of the data files stored in the 
Desktop, Desktop\images idea, Desktop\ images Italian food, Downloads, 
Downloads\Midi, and Downloads\pdf folders. The data files stored in the 
Pictures\2011-04020 Building98 folder consisted of still and video images taken 
with a Canon PowerShot SD960 camera, transferred directly from the camera’s 
Secure Digital (SD) card using Windows Explorer and a Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) connection. 
Within the Pictures folder, we created four PNG files by using the Print Screen 
key to take screen shots, pasting the screen shots into Paint application data files, 
and saving them as .png files. This operation also provided data for the Windows 
clipboard function whereby we were able to later measure the extent to which the 
data wiping tools destroyed this data. 
We placed 13 data files within the Desktop\Culinary Documents folder consisting 
of Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and Portable 
Document Format (PDF) files. All of these files were created on another 
workstation using MS Office 2007, and subsequently transferred onto the test 
system from a USB flash drive. Once these files were placed onto our test system, 
we performed some additional tasks on a subset of these files, as described below. 
After the Chips.docx file was transferred onto our test system from the flash drive, 
we used Microsoft Windows Skydrive document editor to modify the file. We 
added one sentence consisting of “I love Hot Cheetos with Limon!” as the first 
sentence after the heading at the beginning of the document, and we then 
downloaded the modified version of the file back onto the test system replacing 
the original version of the file. 
Similarly, after we transferred the peanut butter.docx file onto our test system 
from the flash drive, we again used Microsoft Windows Skydrive document 
editor to modify the file by deleting the last paragraph from the document. After 
this deletion, we downloaded the modified version of the file back onto the test 
system replacing the original version of the file. 
We performed a similar modification using a different editing tool to modify the 
Brownies.xls spreadsheet after we transferred the file onto our test system from 
the flash drive. For this file, we used Google Docs spreadsheet editor to add the 
text “Red Velvet Cake” into the cell in column C, row 9. After adding the text, we 
downloaded the modified file back onto the test system replacing the original 
version of the file. 
The last file we modified within this folder was the Cheesecake.xls spreadsheet. 
Again, we used Google Docs spreadsheet editor to modify the file after we had 
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transferred it onto our test system. Our modification of this file consisted of 
deleting the contents of the cell located at column B, row 3 and three cells from 
the F column of the spreadsheet, namely rows 3, 4, and 6. After modifying this 
file, we downloaded it back onto our test system replacing the original version of 
the file. 
The modifications made to the four documents described above provide us with a 
sample of files that were originally placed within the folder and subsequently 
modified by one of two different editing tools. This provides us with samples 
from Microsoft Word documents in versions 2003 and 2007, and Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets. Also, both the Word documents and the Excel spreadsheets include 
one file with additions and one file with deletions. Text from the additions and 
deletions are included in keyword searches we performed during our analysis of 
the post-test data described section 3.3 of this paper. 
Table 3 - Evidence data files 
 
Logical path and file name Physical locaton Logical path and file name Physical locaton
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\ C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\Midi
Tiramasu.xlsx 6993864-6993895 Another_One_Bites_the_Dust.mid 5158080-5158119
Chips.docx 22163504-22163535 Crawling.mid 5158120-5158191
Grape Jelly.docx 22163536-22163567 ISawHerStandingThere.mid 26783320-26783383
peanut butter.docx 6104032-6104055
Bread.pdf 28562392-28562439 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\pdf
Chips.pdf 21451968-21452023 Ds_Tetris_Ds.pdf 20714712-20717727
Grape Jelly.pdf 21418712-21418767 lindamanual.pdf 20782480-20782543
Peanut butter.pdf 21452024-21452063 mcm996.pdf 20865208-20865271
Brownies.xls 21418768-21418799
Cheesecake.xls 21418856-21418879 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads
Cookies.xls 22044688-22044759 eraser-demo.exe 18428288-18432615
Tirmasu.xls 22045928-22046215 mseinstall.exe 19929976-19930943
Bread.docx 28562440-28562471 winzip150.exe 2919888-2920199
yahoomailuploader.exe 28047064-28047127
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\
Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg 28399184-28399223 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\
gatsby-idea!.jpg 9523776-9523847 Search chickenpasta.png 20853416-20853695
light_bulb.png 229728-229759 Search applepie images.png 26650944-26653655
idea.jpg 20154632-20154743 Download idea images.png 28389000-28391175
Download italian food images.png 20865640-20865783
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\
italian-food.jpg 6979096-6979207 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\2011-04-20 Building98\
italian_food2.jpg 6978368-6978511 Building98 001.MOV 21423544-21423551
italian_food_recession.jpg 4622608-4622903 Building98 001.THM 28046392-28046399
italian-food-cuisine-pizza.jpg 20864888-20864983 Building98 002.MOV 21423592-21423599
italian-food2.jpg 20718728-20718879 Building98 002.THM 21447272-21447287
Building98 003.MOV 6942120-6942127
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\ Building98 003.THM 21986256-21986279
bbsps.jpg 27122824-27122983 Building98 004.JPG 28578376-28578415
Firefox Setup 4.0.exe 20426720-20451295 Building98 005.JPG 22337800-22338055
HazcomManual.doc 26836808-26839999 Building98 006.JPG 28583240-28584263
Loto.doc 20146400-20147343 Building98 007.JPG 21556472-21557807
Rubric2009.doc 6941616-6941815 Building98 008.JPG 22187512-22194799
wrar400.exe 20778592-20781423 Building98 009.JPG 22216120-22223215
Building98 010.JPG 22227384-22231183
Building98 011.JPG 22235320-22239343
Building98 012.JPG 22250808-22255855
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Overall, the sample user data we generated consisted of 57 data files including 
Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, PDF files, executable 
program files, and multimedia files representing audio, video, and picture content. 
We also included Internet activity, consisting of searches, download history, 
browsing data, and activity from three web-based e-mail applications. To provide 
additional variety with Internet activity files, we installed Mozilla Firefox in 
addition to Microsoft Internet Explorer. Additionally, to represent the actions a 
typical user would perform to delete files, we deliberately deleted files using the 
Windows 7 GUI to ensure that entries were created in the Windows Recycle Bin 
folder. A listing of the data file names is provided in Table 3 - Evidence data files. 
Once we completed the installation of the sample user data on the computer 
workstation, we performed a static data acquisition of the physical device; with 
the computer workstation powered off, we removed the Seagate Barracuda hard 
disk drive, attached it to a Tableau Model T5 write blocking device via an IDE 
ribbon cable, and connected the write blocking device to our Mac Pro forensic 
workstation using a FireWire 800 connection. We used EnCase running under 
Windows XP Professional in native mode on a Mac Pro using BootCamp to 
perform the data acquisition from the physical device of the Seagate Barracuda 
hard disk. We saved the image in an E01 file, and we validated the integrity of the 
data acquisition with Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA-1) hash values. 
We analyzed the image created from this static data acquisition and identified the 
physical sector location of each data file we had stored (Table 3 - Evidence data 
files) and used this image as the starting point from which we installed each of the 
data wiping products. After installing each data wiping application, we acquired 
another image of the physical device. This resulted in six forensic images, one 
without any wiping application installed and five consisting of the data contained 
on the initial image plus one data wiping application; these latter five images 
served as pre-experiment images from which we compared in the post-wipe 
analysis. 
3.2 Data wiping application tasks 
After preparing data images for evaluation, we performed various data wiping 
tasks on each pre-experiment image. The tasks targeted specific items on the 
volume and are described below: 
3.2.1 Active@ Eraser 
Upon launching the Active@ Eraser application, we used its GUI to locate and 
select each of the files within their respective paths listed in Table 3 - Evidence 
data files. We then expanded the Internet & Local Activities option and selected 
each of the following items: 
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 My Internet Auto-Complete (Forms & Passwords) 
 My Internet Cookies 
 My Internet History 
 My Internet Temporary Files 
 My Recently Used List 
 My Recycle Bin 
 My Run History 
 My Temporary Files 
Once all of the files and Internet and local activities had been selected, we clicked 
the “Erase” button and employed the “One Pass Zeros (quick, low security)” 
option. We unselected the “Verify” option and kept the default option to “Ignore 
Errors” (Figure 1 - Screenshot of Active@ ERASER). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Screenshot of Active@ ERASER 
 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2) 
123 
After the process completed successfully, we exited the application and shut 
down the personal computer workstation using the standard Windows 7 shutdown 
function. We then extracted the hard disk drive and acquired a forensic image of 
the entire physical device. 
3.2.2 Window Washer 
Upon launching the Window Washer application, we clicked on the “Wash 
Setup” option and selected the “Custom Wash Items” choice. Within the “Custom 
Wash Items” selection, we selected the individual file names and folders indicated 
in Table 3 - Evidence data files, and we chose the option to add all of the files in 
the preselected file paths. The program indicated that a total of 58 files were 
selected for washing. 
We chose to accept all of the default options for the other settings. The Internet 
items that are selected by default for Internet Explorer are: address bar history, 
cookies, temporary Internet files folder (i.e., cache), history (i.e., visited sites), 
Index.dat, and Auto-Complete form data. The default setting for the Index.dat file 
includes the non-technical user description, “wash with bleach on Windows 
startup.” 
Similarly, the Internet items that are selected by default for Mozilla Firefox are 
Internet cache, cookies, and URL history. Also included by default are Windows 
start menu and desktop items, including the Recycle Bin, document history, Run 
history, and “find and search history.” Additional Windows system items 
included by default include the Windows temp folder and the system temp folder. 
Other items selected by default include recent activity (i.e., Most Recently Used, 
or MRU) for disk error checking and media player recent file list. 
After making the selections indicated above, we selected the “Home” button and 
clicked on the button to “Wash My Computer Now.” After the application 
completed its tasks, we selected the “Finish” option, exited the application 
program, and performed the Windows shutdown process. As above, we then 
made a forensic image of the disk drive. 
3.2.3 Jetico BCWipe 
The BCWipe application was a bit more straight-forward than the two previous 
applications; we merely selected the files to be wiped and selected the option to 
“delete with wiping.” After the operation completed successfully, we exited the 
BCWipe application, and performed the Windows shutdown procedure. 
As with the other applications, after the personal computer workstation was 
powered off, we imaged the hard drive. 
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Figure 2 - Screenshot of Heidi Eraser 
 
3.2.4 Heidi Eraser 
Eraser's wipe function is largely controlled via the “Erase Schedule” function; 
files to be wiped are selected using the “Add Data” option and “Data to erase” list 
(Figure 2 - Screenshot of Heidi Eraser). We verified that the process ran to 
completion, exited the Eraser application, shut down the computer, and made a 
forensic image of the hard drive. 
3.2.5 Evidence Eliminator 
Evidence Eliminator required a fair amount of configuration. From the Windows 
tab, we selected the “Eliminate Swap File” option, and under the Activity Logs 
sub-tab, we selected the options to eliminate Registry Streams (e.g., MRU) and 
Windows application logs. Next, we ensured that all of the options were 
unchecked under the sub-tab for “Other Areas” and then selected the option to 
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eliminate all contents of clipboard memory (Figure 3 - Screenshot of Evidence 
Eliminator).  
Our next step was to check all three items under the Start tab, namely “Eliminate 
‘Run’ history,” “Eliminate ‘Find Computer’ history,” and “Eliminate ‘Find Files’ 
history.” Similarly, under the Recent Activities tab, we selected the options to 
eliminate the recent documents list, start menu order history, and start menu click 
history. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Screenshot of Evidence Eliminator 
 
Evidence Eliminator provided tabs for Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox, and 
we selected options under each of these categories to remove their respective 
components, as indicated below. 
To remove evidence concerning Internet Explorer, under the IE tab, we checked 
the options to eliminate: 
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 History of typed URLs in the Internet Explorer address bar 
 Auto-Complete history of typed form data, URLs and passwords 
 Download folder memory  
 Error logs 
 C:\users\forensics prof\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\ 
 C:\Windows\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\ 
 Internet Explorer Favorites (URL Bookmarks) 
 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Favorites\ 
 C:\Users\Forensics Prof\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\ 
 
Under the Cookies sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate cookies in the 
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\ folder. 
From the Downloaded Components sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate 
components in the C:\Windows\Downloaded Program Files\ folder. 
From the Mozilla tab, we selected the following items to wipe: 
 Cache Folder: C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\Cache 
 Offline Cache: C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\OfflineCac
he 
 History: C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\places.
sqlite 
 URL memories in JavaScript prefs file C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\ 
Under the Cookies sub-tab for Mozilla, we selected the option to eliminate 
Cookies in C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\cookies.sqlite. 
From the “More Options” sub-tab, we selected the option to eliminate the 
following three items: 
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 Downloads: C:\Users\Forensics 
Prof\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\dkvfbgyw.default\downl
oads.sqlite 
 Form History: formhistory.sqlite 
 Session Store sessionstore.js 
 
We then selected the option to eliminate the folder containing Stored Backups for 
Mozilla Bookmarks, “Bookmarkbackups.” 
We accepted the default settings under the “Mail” tab, and under the “Custom 
Files” sub-tab of the “Custom” tab, added the files indicated in Table 3 - Evidence 
data files, and selected the option to eliminate all files included in the list. Also, 
from the “Custom” tab, we selected the option to eliminate all contents of these 
folders, including sub-folder trees. 
We selected the recommended option for maximum speed under the Windows 
sub-tab of the Mode tab, and we selected the option for extra security to rename 
and zero sizes when wiping files. We accepted all of the other default settings, 
and we then saved our selected options. Lastly, from the Evidence Eliminator 
main window, we selected the “Safe Shutdown” to remove the data and exit the 
application. 
As with the other scenarios, we verified that the process ran to completion, exited 
the application, shut down the computer, and imaged the hard drive. 
3.3 Post-wipe analysis 
After completing the experiments for each data wiping application, we compared 
each post-experiment image against its corresponding pre-experiment image 
using a commercially available, validated digital forensics tools, including 
Guidance Software’s EnCase Law Enforcement (v 6.11.2.2) and AccessData’s 
FTK (v1.81). As we compared each pair of images, we focused on identifying any 
persistent markers or trace evidence produced by the wiping process; if present, 
these traces have the potential to yield valuable information to a digital forensics 
examiner concerning the activities that have occurred on the computer system. 
Our procedures to analyze the results of the data wiping experiments involved 
seven steps: 
1. We located the physical sector of each evidence file in the pre-
experiment image, as shown in Table 3 - Evidence data files. For each 
post-experiment image, we used EnCase to navigate to the physical 
sector locations of the selected files to determine the data contents at 
the locations. 
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2. We generated a list of 99 keywords that were included in the evidence 
files and performed a search on the pre-experiment image of these 
keywords and on each of the post-experiment images. 
3. Based on the pre-experiment image, we created a hash set that included 
the MD5 hash values for all 57 evidence files. Using EnCase, we 
performed a hash analysis on each of the post-experiment images. 
4. Using the pre-experiment image, we performed a search for Internet 
history by using the EnCase search function. Similarly, we performed 
the same search on each of the post-experiment images. 
5. Using the pre-experiment image, we used EnCase to show all of the 
contents of the device and sorted the contents by file creation date. We 
then performed the same analysis function on each of the post-
experiment images. The primary purpose for looking at file creation 
date is to identify any items created by the data wiping applications, 
such as placeholder files. 
6. We used AccessData’s Registry Viewer (v1.5.4.44) to analyze registry 
keys contained within the pre-experiment image and each of the post-
experiment images. Alghafli, Jones, and Martin (2010) provided 
additional reassurance that our registry analysis should focus on eight 
different registry folders within the NTUSER.DAT file. 
7. We used Regshot (v1.8.2) to analyze changes to the Windows Registry 
(Geeknet, Inc., 2009). We used Regshot to take a snapshot of the pre-
experiment image and each of the post-experiment images, and 
compared the differences between the different post-experiment for 
each data wiping application. 
 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1 Physical sector analysis 
Our first step in analyzing each of the data wiping applications was to examine 
the physical locations of each of the files listed in Table 3 - Evidence data files on 
the post-experiment images to determine if any remnants existed. Four of the five 
applications we tested successfully wiped the selected files. Window Washer 
deleted the files, but failed to wipe them from the physical location on the disk 
drive. 
4.2 Keyword search analysis 
We performed a keyword search analysis with EnCase using the 99 keywords 
described in section 3.3. The raw numbers of keyword search hits for each data 
wiping application are provided in Table 4 - Keyword search analysis. Based on 
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the keyword search results, Evidence Eliminator was the most thorough at 
removing instances of the keywords from the disk image while Window Washer 
allowed the largest number of keywords to remain on the disk image. The 
majority of items located through the keyword search were from Microsoft Word 
(.doc) and Excel (.xls) files found in unallocated clusters within the NTFS volume 
of the post-experiment images. Other instances of the keywords were found in the 
pagefile and system volume. 
Table 4 - Keyword search analysis 
Data Wiping Application Total Number of Keyword Search 
Hits 
Active@ ERASER 34,768 
Heidi Eraser 36,031 
Evidence Eliminator 26.748 
Jetico BCWipe 36,557 
Webroot Window Washer 39,635 
 
4.3 MD5 hash analysis 
We performed an MD5 hash analysis using the hash set of the files identified in 
Table 3 - Evidence data files; a summary of the results is presented in Table 5 - 
MD5 hash analysis. Again, Window Washer only deleted the files rather than 
wiping them; therefore, the hash analysis uncovered all of the evidence files. 
Discounting the results from Window Washer, we found two patterns from our 
review of the MD5 hash analysis results that we considered noteworthy. With the 
exception of the single match from Evidence Eliminator, all of the matches from 
the MD5 hash analysis were images, and the majority of those images were 
downloaded through Mozilla Firefox. 
Table 5 - MD5 hash analysis 
Data Wiping Application Total Number of MD5 Hash Value Hits 
Active@ ERASER 12 matches found, all from Mozilla Firefox 
Heidi Eraser 11 matches found, most from Mozilla Firefox 
Evidence Eliminator 1 match found 
Jetico BCWipe 11 matches found, most from Mozilla Firefox 
Webroot Window Washer 100% matches found 
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4.4 Internet search analysis 
We used the comprehensive search function of EnCase to analyze the Internet 
history of the post-experiment images for each of the data wiping applications. 
We found that each tool produced different results and none of them completely 
removed all evidence of Internet activity. We examined the contents of the 
Internet history folders associated with Internet Explorer and Firefox using 
EnCase to determine whether there was any indication of Internet activity in the 
post-wipe images. 
 
Table 6 - Internet search evidence comparison 
Browser 
 
Prior to 
Wiping 
Active@ 
ERASER 
Webroot 
Window 
Washer 
Jetico 
BCWipe 
Heidi 
Eraser 
Evidence 
Eliminator 
Internet Explorer:       
Completely Erased N/A No No No No No 
Bookmarks 78 90 89 101 97 39 
Typed URLs 11 12 0 11 11 0 
Daily 340 356 360 455 605 188 
Weekly N/A 241 241 134 134 134 
Visited Link 633 799 868 820 1031 314 
Cache Total 5915 6515 6438 7904 7540 4755 
Code 1499 1494 1859 2154 2118 653 
Image 3188 3170 3836 4614 4546 1393 
HTML 258 256 320 374 368 119 
XML 28 28 32 37 35 11 
Text 36 35 48 49 48 15 
Cookies After 522 223 672 633 633 113 
Mozilla Firefox:       
Completely Erased N/A No No No No Yes 
Cache Total 1735 1735 61 1751 1749 0 
Code 312 312 11 314 313 0 
Image 848 848 30 856 862 0 
HTML 241 241 6 243 244 0 
XML 17 17 0 17 17 0 
Text 21 21 0 21 21 0 
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We found that that some files and folders were wiped while others were only 
deleted from the Master File Table and labeled as unallocated clusters; however, 
the contents were still detected by EnCase. Table 6 - Internet search evidence 
comparison provides a tabular comparison of the five wiping applications 
organized by Internet activity attributes for the two browsers. The values shown 
in the table indicate the number of records detected in the corresponding folder for 
each browser prior to installing a wiping tool and after using an installed wiping 
tool. Notice that the prior-to-wiping values for some measurements, such as 
Internet Explorer’s Bookmarks, are smaller than the after-wiping values for 
several wiping tools. This is a result of the technique we used to install each of the 
wiping tools. The prior-to-wiping measure is based on an image of the data prior 
to installing a wiping tool. After this image was created, using restored copies of 
the image, we accessed the Internet and used a browser to locate and download 
the installation file for each wiping tool. This technique added data to the disk that 
was not on the prior-to-wiping image. 
4.4.1 Analysis of the Internet Explorer browser 
Two of the wiping applications, Window Washer and Evidence Eliminator, 
completely removed all entries from the “Typed URL” folder; however, all of the 
applications left other relevant data, including the cache, visited history, and 
cookies. 
BCWipe removed the fewest number of records from the cache, with 7,904 
records remaining after its execution. Evidence Eliminator removed the most 
records, leaving 4,755 records in the cache folder. Evidence Eliminator also left 
the fewest records in the “Visited Link” and “Cookies” folder with 314 and 113 
records left, respectively. Heidi Eraser left the most records in the “Visited Link” 
folder with 1,031 records remaining. For the “Cookies” folder, Window Washer 
left the most records 672. Interestingly, Active@ ERASER somehow increased 
the number of records in the bookmarks folder from 86 records prior to execution 
to 90 records after execution. 
4.4.2. Analysis of the Mozilla Firefox browser 
Only Evidence Eliminator removed all detectable Internet history data elements 
using EnCase’s Internet history search. All of the other wiping applications left 
relevant data in Firefox’s Internet history. Eraser left the most traces of evidence 
in the “Cache” folder with 1,749 records left. Window Washer also removed all 
of the records from the XML and text folders, and it removed the second largest 
number of records from the other Firefox folders (after Evidence Eliminator). 
4.5 Analysis of newly created files 
We examined each of the post-experiment images to determine the extent with 
which any new files were created on the image after the image's data wiping 
application was executed. We found that all of the applications we studied created 
either log files or placeholder files, and some of them created both. We think 
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these findings are significant, as the data created by these applications provide 
valuable information that is useful for digital forensics examiners in determining 
the extent in which wiping activities were implemented. Specific findings from 
each application are provided below. 
4.5.1 Files created by Active@ ERASER  
Active@ ERASER created two types of files that are noteworthy. The first is an 
INI file that details which files the tool attempted to wipe (Figure 4 - Active@ 
Eraser INI File). The second type of file is a placeholder file with a .tmp 
extension. These .tmp files were created by Active@ ERASER to replace the files 
that were wiped and located under the same file paths of the original files. Two 
examples of the placeholder files are provided in Figure 5 - Placeholder files 
created by Active@ ERASER. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Active@ Eraser INI File 
 
Last Accessed   04/25/11 04:21:52PM 
File Created   04/25/11 04:21:52PM 
Last Written   04/25/11 08:56:09PM 
Physical Size  4,096 
Physical Location 106,270,720 
Hash Value   8ef4b1ad9fb88d7f2252d32ec3be5a09 
Full Path   SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Program Files\Active Data Security Solutions 
\Active Eraser Demo\EraserD.ini 
[GeneralSettings]  
StartupRun=1  
RunMinimized=0  
ConfirmManualErase=1  
ConfirmScheduleErase=0  
ErasingMethod=2  
KeyExit=88  
KeyCleanup=67  
KeySetting=83  
[StartPlacement]  
Width=785  
Height=560  
TreeRight=250  
[ScheduleSettings]  
StartOptions=0  
[CheckedFiles]  
0=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\2011-04-20 Building98  
1=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search chickenpasta.png  
2=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search applepie images.png  
3=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download italian food images.png  
4=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download idea images.png  
5=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food_recession.jpg  
6=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food2.jpg  
7=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food2.jpg  
8=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food.jpg  
9=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food-cuisine-pizza.jpg  
10=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\light_bulb.png  
11=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg  
12=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\idea.jpg  
13=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\gatsby-idea!.jpg  
14=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\pdf  
15=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\midi  
16=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents  
17=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\yahoomailuploader_0.5.exe 
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4.5.2 Files created by Window Washer 
During our analysis of the Window Washer post-experiment image, we identified 
a log file named Custom.mst that was created by the application. This log file 
provides details of the files selected for wiping (Figure 6 - Log File Created by 
Window Washer). 
 
 
Figure 5 - Placeholder files created by Active@ ERASER 
 
4.5.3 Files created by BCWipe 
From our analysis of the BCWipe post-experiment image, we found that this 
application also creates placeholder files within their respective folders to replace 
the files that were wiped. The majority of the filenames of the placeholder files 
appear to be random characters, and some of them include file extensions. Table 7 
- BCWipe Placeholder files contains a listing of the placeholder files names 
within their respective folders. 
 
 
Name    Z8518.tmp 
Signature   Match 
Last Accessed  04/19/11 12:36:18PM 
File Created   04/25/11 08:53:11PM 
Last Written   04/25/11 08:53:11PM 
Physical Location  10,458,480,640 
Physical Sector  20,426,720 
Hash Value   52ed7cd2a664bc45274e8e1eded33718 
Full Path   SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Users\Forensics                                 
Prof\Desktop\Z8518.tmp 
 
Name    Z85C6.tmp 
Signature   Match 
Last Accessed  04/19/11 12:58:57PM 
File Created   04/25/11 08:53:11PM 
Last Written   04/25/11 08:53:11PM 
Physical Location  13,886,885,888 
Physical Sector  27,122,824 
Hash Value   249e1be6d20f3da440dc421b69ff5a64 
Full Path  SPS2011 WT1b\Wiping Tool 1b\D\Users\Forensics        
   Prof\Desktop\Z85C6.tmp 
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4.5.4 Files created by Eraser 
Our analysis of the Eraser post-experiment image yielded only one relevant file 
that was created after running the application, namely a log file named Task 
List.esrx. This log files appears to contain much metadata; however, for 
formatting purposes, we are omitting a copy of it from this paper due to its length 
and extensive quantity non-printable characters. However, it seems likely that 
additional, valuable content might be available if one were to become aware of 
the formatting structure of this log file, as many of the unprintable characters may 
contain important metadata, such as dates and time or binary values. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Log File Created by Window Washer 
4.5.5 Files created by Evidence Eliminator 
As in our analysis of the Eraser post-experiment image, we found that the 
Evidence Eliminator post-experiment image contained only one newly created 
file of significant value, and it, too, was a log file. The Evidence Eliminator log 
file is named Files.dat and it lists the pathnames of files wiped by the application. 
The metadata associated with this log file and its visual contents are shown in 
Figure 7 - Evidence Eliminator log file. 
Name    Custom.mst 
File Ext    mst 
Signature   Unknown 
File Created   04/26/11 02:03:03PM 
Last Accessed   04/26/11 02:03:03PM 
Last Written   04/26/11 02:03:03PM 
Entry Modified   04/26/11 02:03:03PM 
Physical Location   1,015,377,920 
Physical Sector  1,983,160 
Hash Value   584237ae2bb271be9e5e96eee0dcf0e0 
Full Path    WPT2b\Window Washer\D\Users\ForensicsProf\AppData\Roaming\Webroot 
\Washer\Plugins\Custom.mst 
[Desktop]  
FileCount=58  
File00=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\bbsps.jpg  
File01=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Downloads.lnk  
File02=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Firefox Setup 4.0.exe  
File03=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\HazcomManual.doc  
File04=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Loto.doc  
File05=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\rubric2009.doc  
File06=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\wrar400.exe  
File07=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Bread.docx  
File08=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Bread.pdf  
File09=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Brownies.xls  
File10=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Cheesecake.xls  
File11=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Chips.docx  
File12=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Chips.pdf  
File13=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Cookies.xls  
File14=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Grape Jelly.docx  
File15=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Grape Jelly.pdf  
File16=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\peanut butter.docx  
File17=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\peanut butter.pdf  
File18=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Tiramasu.xls  
File19=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Culinary Documents\Tiramasu.xlsx  
File20=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\gatsby-idea!.jpg  
File21=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\idea.jpg  
File22=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\light_bulb.png  
File23=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images idea\Light-Bulb-Idea-Hand.jpg  
File24=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food_recession.jpg  
File25=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian_food2.jpg  
File26=C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\images italian food\italian-food.jpg 
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Table 7 - BCWipe Placeholder files 
\Users\Forensics 
Prof\Downloads\ 
\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\ 
moiodwblfgrrvee xviiijsnertmaf 
swsiraumlbmkveqamtejxccx ffcnwfqquketc 
pwsqswva.wey twgkthep.owl 
ohceabbdgtnuequybbnepvwotjq
veu 
oecjpxuajpbuexbj 
lyxlvckrsnybr ldwaskdaiqofxsnrwt 
vacjbeidbbisdp ufngsqha.hmr 
qggkugyl.gmu iexiyvlm.fqa 
rfrsprfdyvnovctm ycfdkmcbdhaiaev 
rfrsprfdyvnovctm fhthkuxdrwcleucqs 
desktop.ini bijmfhau.urn 
pdf yackamehuvmnir 
midi lxxxojhu.jew 
 hjkoyytm.dyj 
\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\ cudyehux.smb 
pikbamjhkbtxwulahv wwvcuqkoiicplg 
eymerktseesfjycwdd ohceabbdgtnuequybboepvwo 
jnvarjoegbprhuotrl jjrutfhrhlyrfaxb 
dwapvgpwbnprouranv bhkwfcuo.xpk 
oedbbbpmvqxwbajldn astyclxp.dwr 
ufmvpgwmfklqkilbcu qgmmiqsotndovvokgjxmjmgtrpfmyxnlmuw
fykcusali 
maamiufhrnomehrlha kbkdyidlcvibbxuy 
hcwhoqhpyndlyvqfaj pftjrgprdprgmehe 
tramtucnfiyxjwbhov pgcjyjlrwhwkmhpov 
kfvpbpibhekldukfgbvnelljxacaq
nkv 
hcbvomvrndmbjeiewxtpbqlwno 
wqmxbkrmmmvobiqnlv rkuappyibbfpekvuiohnwqrrkhksnc 
dlbkuoqsmoffpwyhpn yuxrmnovlmgmneqcc 
inqfjfhqoivsexcpgc kbcmishjtifmtnlcnohxdxbxqn 
ntpureeuykmnkukbgf klywbver.jwo 
fgkumsxeqmkaunnibhsenqme jtsmjnniyfxbfhknmrsem 
rujsqrklixgdfgwtnbiwaix idgqtemk.kif 
dkqvodvehoeyjqcujrmbwudcmv  
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Figure 7 - Evidence Eliminator log file 
 
4.6 Windows registry analysis 
Our Windows registry analysis is the first of two methods we used to review the 
contents of Windows registry data. In this first method, we used AccessData’s 
Registry Viewer to search the contents within the post-experiment images for 
each of the data wiping applications we studied. 
Our Windows registry analysis focused on the NTUSER.DAT registry file (i.e., 
hive) and we evaluated the values for several subdirectories (i.e., keys). The paths 
we analyzed are listed in  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - NTUSER.DAT subdirectory analysis. 
Comment    Evidence Eliminator Log. 
Name    Files.dat 
Signature    ! Bad signature 
File Created  05/02/11 04:48:22PM 
Last Accessed  05/02/11 04:48:22PM 
Last Written  05/03/11 02:08:10PM 
Entry Modified  05/03/11 02:08:10PM 
Physical Location 2,385,395,712 
Physical Sector  4,658,976 
Hash Value   37b663d1364ee98a32b8f6cd8da8bb02 
Full Path    WT5b\SPS2011WT5b\D\Program Files\Evidence Eliminator\Data\Files.dat 
 
 
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\bbsps.jpg 
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\downloads.lnk  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Firefox Setup 4.0.exe  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\HazcomManual.doc  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Loto.doc  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\Rubric2009.doc  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Desktop\wrar400.exe  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\mseinstall.exe  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\winzip150.exe  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Downloads\yahoomailuploader.exe  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download idea images.png  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Download italian food images.png  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search applepie images.png  
C:\Users\Forensics Prof\Pictures\Search chickenpasta.png 
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Table 8 - NTUSER.DAT subdirectory analysis 
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Internet 
Explorer>TypedURLs 
  
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
IAM   
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
RecentDo
cs 
 
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
RunMRU  
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
ComDlg3
2> 
LastVisitedPidl
MRU 
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
ComDlg3
2> 
OpenSavePidlM
RU 
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
ComDlg3
2> 
FirstFolder 
NTUSER.DAT>Software>Mi
crosoft> 
Windows>CurrentVersion>E
xplorer> 
ComDlg3
2> 
CIDSizeMRU 
 
In analyzing these NTUSER.DAT subdirectories, we examined the post-
experiment images of each wiping application. As we located traces of evidence 
pertaining to the files we had planted for wiping or any evidence indicating that a 
data wiping application had run, we then tracked these findings using the 
bookmarking feature within Registry Viewer. These bookmarks were 
subsequently included in reports we generated from Registry Viewer. 
Three of the five wiping applications did not remove items from the 
NTUSER.DAT subdirectories. Using AccessData’s Registry Viewer, we found 
entries for typed URLs, Internet accounts, recent documents, and recently used 
programs in the post-experiment images for Active@ ERASER, BCWipe, and 
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Eraser. Evidence Eliminator and Window Washer did remove data from their 
respective NTUSER.DAT files with different levels of completeness. 
Window Washer removed the typed URLs and a portion of the data regarding 
recent documents. However, evidence remained that revealed the names of the 
most recently run programs, Internet accounts, and partial information concerning 
recent documents. 
Of the five applications we analyzed, Evidence Eliminator performed the most 
thorough cleansing of the NTUSER.DAT data. Evidence Eliminator removed the 
entries in the typed URLs and recent documents subdirectories; however, Internet 
accounts remained in the NTUSER.DAT file, and additional data were present that 
indicated that the Evidence Eliminator application had been recently used. 
All of the applications we analyzed left trace evidence in the NTUSER.DAT file. 
While some of the applications were more successful at removing evidence of 
previous activity than others, enough data remained to provide valuable 
information. Based on these findings, we suggest that forensics examiners 
routinely examine the NTUSER.DAT file, especially in cases where there is 
concern regarding the use of data wiping. 
4.7 Regshot analysis 
We used the Regshot utility to capture and compare a snapshot of the Windows 
Registry for the pre-experiment image and each of the post-experiment images. A 
summary of the changes in registry entries is provided in Table 9 - Regshot 
comparison summary. This table indicates the number of keys deleted or added 
from the execution of each data wiping application, as well as, additions, 
deletions, or modifications of values within the registry. The volume of data 
provided within the registry snapshots overwhelmed our current personnel 
resources for analysis; therefore, we were not able to fully examine the extent to 
which all of the registry entries were impacted by the execution of the data wiping 
tools. We did find sufficient evidence to justify continuing this evaluation in 
future studies, and we encourage other researchers to consider this topic. 
 
Table 9 - Regshot comparison summary 
 Active@ 
ERASER 
Window 
Washer 
Jetico 
BCWipe 
Heidi 
Eraser 
Evidence 
Eliminator 
Keys Deleted 31 50,960 705 59,811 60,916 
Keys Added 38 828 3,135 166 3,253 
Values Deleted 63 156,161 1,428 207,899 213,523 
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Values Added 108 2,855 8,786 1,053 9,908 
Values Modified 353 2,316 2,075 429 3,286 
Total Changes 593 213,120 16,129 269,358 290,886 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
While the five data wiping applications we analyzed provide utilities for users to 
destroy data, we found that all of them leave some trace artifacts that may be 
valuable to digital forensics examiners. We found that all of the applications 
created log or other files that detailed their activity and all neglected to remove all 
relevant data within the Windows 7 Registry. Additionally, these applications left 
data regarding the usage of the Internet Explorer browser, and all but one of them 
left data regarding the Firefox browser. 
Based on our analysis of these five applications, we suggest that digital forensics 
examiners routinely analyze the Windows Registry in situations where the 
examiner is concerned about the use of data wiping applications. For many years 
we have considered Windows Registry analysis to be among the activities 
performed during a thorough digital forensic analysis of a Windows-based 
workstation or server, and we do not think that the specific tasks identified within 
this paper significantly complicates or prolongs the digital forensic analysis 
procedure. In our opinions, the potential benefits derived from finding evidence 
resulting from the Windows Registry analysis outweigh the costs associated with 
performing the minor additional procedures. 
We have also considered the long-term impact of these findings on digital 
forensic analysis. As this information regarding trace evidence from target-
specific data wiping software applications become more disseminated, it is likely 
that software developers will modify their applications to reduce the amount of 
trace evidence left after its execution, and the more technically informed users of 
target-specific data wiping software applications will likely take additional steps 
to more thoroughly conceal their activities. As a result of these likely future 
changes, we anticipate that the amount of trace evidence recovered from 
Windows Registry analysis will decline; however, for the foreseeable future, we 
consider an analysis of the Windows Registry to be an essential part of a thorough 
digital forensic analysis of a Windows-based workstation or server. 
6. LIMITATIONS 
In this study, we analyzed only five data wiping applications that function on 
Windows 7 based systems. While our methodology of performing measured 
experiments based on identical data supports generalization, our small sample size 
does impose significant statistical limitations that make us reluctant to generalize 
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these findings. Our limited resources, particularly temporal constraints, prohibited 
us from thoroughly analyzing the extent to which all Windows Registry keys 
were modified from the data we collected in our Regshot analysis. Nonetheless, 
the results we obtained are applicable for the experimental conditions, and the 
methodology that we outlined here was successful in defining a process and 
procedure with which to carry out additional experiments in more detail and with 
a broader suite of applications. 
We recognize that there are instances whereby users have legitimate reasons for 
using target-specific data wiping application software. It would be beneficial to 
provide data concealment information for uses in these instances; however, our 
focus during this study was directed at a scenario in which a forensic examiner is 
tasked to recover evidence from a Windows 7 workstation where the user utilized 
target-specific application software to conceal data or activities. Based on our 
research focus, we address the forensic examiner’s role of identifying trace 
evidence without regard to normative values. 
A potential counterproductive artifact from this study is that the authors of data 
removal applications may become more aware of the trace evidence that we have 
exposed and modify their applications to nullify our findings, thus raising the anti-
forensics bar. That is, of course, a downside to any research in this space, as those 
who hide evidence can often stay ahead of those who are tasked with finding it. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of wiping software that is "examination-proof" 
does not mean that users will properly employ it and, therefore, research in this 
area can still be used to inform the digital forensics community. 
7. CALL FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
A more thorough analysis of the Windows Registry modifications might prove to 
be valuable. Additional research from a larger, scientific sample of data wiping 
applications might lead to a better understanding of this area, so that 
generalizations can be recognized. 
In addition, as data wiping becomes more commonly available, even built in with 
operating systems and user applications, computer forensics examiners need to 
have a more defined approach to detecting when wiping programs have been used 
and the mechanism employed. To that end, we need to have testing methods in 
place as new operating systems, applications, and versions of applications become 
available. Test beds to help detect wiping signatures, including remnants in the 
registry and other log files, will greatly enhance our ability for this very detection. 
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